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Abstract 
Prior researches on listed companies have reported many useful literatures about risk 
disclosures either in UK or in other countries. Using the combination of 
hand-collected data and secondary data, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
examine risk disclosure practices of fifteen U.S. listed companies from three different 
industries, over a period of five years. The method of collecting data is content 
analysis. This study attempts to investigate risk disclosures from the industry point of 
view, whether there is any relationships between company size, level of company risk, 
company performance and the volume of risk disclosures. Nine risk measures are 
used in the hypothesis tests: Turnover ratio, Market Value, Market Capitalization, 
Gearing ratio, Beta factor, and Book to Market value of equity, Profit margin, 
Dividend per Share, and Return on Equity. In addition, the developing trend on the 
volume of risk disclosures and the impacts generated from industry nature to the 
volume of risk disclosures are also discussed in this study.  
 
One of the findings in this study is that there is no association between the level of 
risk and the volume of risk disclosures in the same industry. There isn ?t a clear 
relationship existing between company size, company performance and the volume 
of risk disclosures. It is found that companies belong to different industries appear to 
disclose risk information in different levels. The total volume of risk disclosures has 
increased significantly for the past five years in the same industry. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Overviews 
Stories like that of Parmalat and WorldCom companies are possible to happen again 
throughout the commercial world, although companies now disclose more risk 
information than ever before. Investors cost billions of dollars for those scandals 
because of share prices slumping. The confidence of both investors and shareholders 
are shook by those irregulatory accounting behaviors in the securities market. In 
order to increase confidence for shareholders, there are many different ways for 
each company to release risk information such as disclosing risks through corporate 
web sites, and annual reports, and so forth. The aim of the annual reports is to 
convey ƵƐĞĨƵů ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ
references and other decisions over the fiscal year. In order to satisfy the demand of 
disclosing risk from outsiders, the annual reports, as public documents, shows a 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ risk in a better official way together with public media or other 
broadcasting transport. 
 
Models that incorporate risk disclosures and other economic environmental factors 
have been tested by several researchers in single-country studies (Abraham & Cox, 
2007, and Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007) or multi-countries (Boesso & Kumar, 2005, and 
so on). For example, Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) conclude that there is a significant 
relationship between size, type of auditor, listing status and economic sector 
(financial/non-financial) and risk disclosure degree in Portuguese. My inspiration for 
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the comparisons among different relationships in the same non-financial industry 
came from that previous evidence. 
 
1.2 The objectives of study 
Overall, this study is based on previous empirical theories. Companies in different 
countries might have different risk disclosure practices and legislations. It is valuable 
to check whether companies in the same industry have their own similar industry 
risk features when disclosing risk information in the annual reports. Additionally, the 
relationships between company size, performance, level of risk and the volume of 
risk disclosures are also worth being checked in the same industry during the five 
examined years. There are three main research objectives in this study: 
1. Are there any relationships between company sizes, level of risk, company 
performance and the total volume of risk disclosures in the same industry 
during the five fiscal years? 
2. Is there any relationship between the volume of risk disclosures and its 
relevant industry characteristic in the same industry?  
3. Has the volume of risk disclosures in companies ? annual report been changed 
significantly in each industry for the five examined fiscal years? 
 
In order to explore possible answers, 15 U.S. listed companies on the Standard 
 ?WŽŽƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ?are randomly picked out. All the secondary data are obtained from 
DataStream except hand-collected data for the amount of risk disclosures. This study 
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is mainly designed to identify some visible trends on risk disclosures in the annual 
reports. A content analysis methodology is used when collecting the amount of risk 
disclosures. 
 
1.3 The outline of the paper 
This study is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction about main topic, introduces three research 
objectives and outlines a structure for the whole study;  
Chapter 2 firstly explains the general concepts of risk and risk classification, risk 
disclosure, annual report, and then describes the debates of risk reporting in the 
United States of America by analysing the local legislation literatures and relevant 
developments.  
According to the five main research questions, concrete hypotheses and the 
relevant regression functions are developed in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 4 introduces research methodology and data collecting procedure 
together with their relevant limitations respectively.  
Chapter 5 analyses sample data, and then summarises results and presents the 
findings. 
The last Chapter draws the above conclusions, then concludes the limitations of 
this study and makes future research suggestions.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Definite risk, annual report and risk disclosure 
Risk definition 
The term  ‘ƌŝƐŬ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶŵĂŶǇĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĂŶĚĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƐƐŝŶĐĞ
 ? ? ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? dŚĞ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ƌŝƐŬ ? ŝƐ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ before 
performing any risk disclosure study. Risk has many different explanations in previous 
study (see e.g. William et al (1998), Lupton (1999), Harrington and Niehaus (2003) 
and Linsley and Shrives (2006), and so forth). One classical conception of risk is 
viewed as  ‘the chance of ŝŶũƵƌǇ ? ĚĂŵĂŐĞ ? Žƌ ůŽƐƐ ?. Therefore, it is important to 
distinguish between risk and detriment. Risk is the probability that some adverse 
events occur during a certain period of time. It is a potential variation in outcome. 
But detriment is a measurement of the expected damage or loss within a negative 
event. Thus, it is inaccurate to consiĚĞƌ ‘ƌŝƐŬ ?ĂƐŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? 
 
The ways of categorising risk diversify from different researchers and theory models. 
It is necessary to hold a clear understanding of different risk categorisations by 
reviewing different classification methods. At the level of households, in 2001 World 
Bank Group thought risk referred to uncertain events, which could damage 
well-being, would belong to the timing or the importance of the event, such as the 
risk of becoming ill and the risk that a nature disaster would occur. In such senses, 
Sigel and McWilliams (2000) conclude two risks: 
11 
 
Idiosyncratic risks: specific risks in household such as illnesses, death of earning 
householder, or unexpected loss from jobs. 
Covariate risks: the size of risk pool is the basis for the covariation of risks. If there is 
a small risk pool, the impacts of idiosyncratic risks are similar to covariate risks.  
 
At the level of enterprises, Dickinson (2001) describes risk as the unpredicted 
outcome generated from the differences between the corporate strategy of a 
company and corporate objective of a company. Harrington and Niehaus (2003) 
consider risks from a business point of view. They conclude three major business 
risks that firms are facing when their major source are fluctuated in business value.  
 
Price risk: cash flows might generate risks through the changes of financial factors 
such as commodity price, exchange rate, and interest rate and so on. 
Credit risk: This kind of risk generated from the failure for a firm itself or other parties 
to repay a debtor ?s loan.  
Pure risk: pure risk is related to employee benefit plans. For example, it can be the 
risk of physical damage, theft loss or expropriation to business assets in a firm; it can 
be the risk of legal liabilities which happened among customers, suppliers and other 
parties such as inferior products provided by suppliers; it can also be the risk of 
affording unexpected expense from employee ?s death, illness or disability.  
 
 
12 
 
Risk classification 
linsley and Shrives (2005) provide a broad definition of risk. In defining risk for their 
study, disclosures have been judged to be risk disclosures that has already influenced 
the company ?s benefits or may influence the company ?s benefits in the future or the 
impact on the risks or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, 
harm, threat or exposures, if the reader is informed of any opportunity or prospect or 
of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure. A risk model, which has been used 
in many risk disclosure studies such as Kajuሷ ter (2001), was developed by one of the 
professional accountancy firms (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW), 1998).  
 
As the risk disclosures research is comparatively limited, there are much fewer 
previous studies which are based on a coding instrument. Hackston and Milne ?s 
(1996) also found that the coding instrument is suitable to accountancy firm in client 
interactions and the sentence characteristics. Thus, risk disclosures in this study will 
be coded into different categories in every fiscal year according to the different 
sentence characteristics of risk information. This risk model consists of six risk 
categories: financial risks, operations risks, empowerment risks, information 
processing and technology risks, integrity risk and strategic risks. All of the details 
about the types of risks are classified within each of the categories (Appendix A). 
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Annual report 
As a mandated document, annual report repeats to update useful information to 
users for better decision-making every year. The annual report of a company 
comprises both financial and non-financial information. Shareholders and other 
stakeholders will check the risk information so as to evaluate the risk of their 
investments. In other words, greater transparency of a company ?s activity can be 
reflected by more risk information disclosed in the annual report. Since 1965, annual 
reports have grown in volume but their size has still kept to be stabilized. In most 
reports, a theme related to customers or employees might be carried and the front 
half always organised by line of business. Larger companies prefer to outsource the 
preparation of the annual report to external design agencies in recent years. 
Additionally, it should be noticed that annual report, as a one-way communications, 
is still focusing on financial information and past performance. 
 
Risk disclosure  
With the increasing demands for firms to disclose their risks, Woods et al (2004, p3) 
argue that risk disclosure primarily in the use of the annual report is  ‘a mechanism 
that potentially sheds light on internal risk management policies and practices ?. Thus, 
shareholders and investors could learn more ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĨŝƌŵƐ ?ƌŝƐŬĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞƐĂŶĚƌŝƐŬ
management policies externally. However, there are some phenomena which are 
considered to lack of responsibilities or legal obligations for public investors. Just as 
ICAEW (1999) conclude, both the quantity and quality of risk information disclosed in 
14 
 
prospectuses are generally considered to be better than in annual reports. The 
non-accounts information disclosed in annual report are more compliant to 
regulations. Thus, risk disclosure is less company-specific. In addition, some 
blandness of risk disclosures does not provide any explicit details of the actions 
ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƚĂŬĞŶƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝƐŬƐ ?dŚŽƐĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌƐ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐŽŶ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?
comparing analysis among different companies. Extending this problem into realm of 
financial reporting, risk disclosures in financial reporting can be divided into two 
parts: voluntary and mandatory disclosures.  
 
The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB, 2000) describes voluntary 
disclosures as the risk information that accounting rules or standards did not require 
explicitly. The accounting regulatory institutions in USA encourage firms to disclose 
additional information so as to gain more benefits. For example, shareholders may be 
reassured if additional information protects their interests. Companies may decide to 
engage in voluntary disclosure when they need to response innovations, 
globalization or changes in business and capital market environments (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001).  
 
However, if there does not have enough incentives to voluntarily disclose information, 
companies will not disclose additional information without mandatory regulations. 
Once iŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ĨŝƌŵƐ ? ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ was 
under-disclosed, proper assessment of the risk exposures of companies would be 
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prevented in the region (Rahman, 1998). In order to maintain certain level of 
disclosing risk information, policymaking bodies concentrate their efforts on 
publicising the benefits of risk disclosures and providing evidence of their existence 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2003).  
 
Risk disclosure benefits 
The practices of risk disclosures can improve the situation of asymmetric information 
between investors and managers (Linsmeier et al, 2001). Disclosing risks in annual 
reports can help companies attract external interested investors or other interested 
groups and gain a lower cost of capital (Wood et al, 2004). Risk disclosure not only 
provides the risks a company faces, but also enables investors or other interested 
groups to analyse the methods of dealing with the risks. Thus, it helps investors to 
increase the probability of making right assessments and helps shareholders to 
reduce monitoring costs. Risk management, as a dynamic process, enhanced 
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐto do more transparent risk disclosures in their annual reports in 
order to explain the potential impacts ŽĨĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ŝŶĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ƌŝƐŬƉƌŽĨŝůĞŽŶƚŚĞ
business value (Linsley et al, 2008). As a result, disclosing risk information cuts the 
financial charges and creates financial benefits to companies.  
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2.2 The development of risk disclosure  
The first debate on the importance of risk reporting is a discussion paper entitled 
 “&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ZĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ZŝƐŬ-WƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ĨŽƌ Ă ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ZŝƐŬ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝs 
published by ICAEW (1998). Although current annual reports provide more forms for 
risk disclosures, discussions about the risks, which challenge the company and the 
actions that the directors are planning to mitigate the risks, are not presented in a 
comprehensible manner for shareholders to understand (Linsley and Shrives, 2006).  
 
With the development of legislations in USA, the mandatory disclosures are required 
to disclose in a more professional manner so as to make investors clearly understand 
the risks. The usefulness of risk disclosures are mostly determined on market-based 
in the USA. For example, Linsmeir et al (2002) investigate the relationship between 
interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates and commodity prices and risk 
disclosures ?dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƐƚƌŽŶŐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂďŽƵƚŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ƵƐĂŐĞ
ŽĨ ƌŝƐŬ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ? dŚĞ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ &ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A&O) in annual report is also an important 
section for studies which is used to check whether it provides information that is 
valuable to the stakeholders, such as the study of retail industry by Cole and Jones 
(2004). The views of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) points out that recent surveys 
conducted among institutional investors have revealed a strong demand for 
increased corporate risk management disclosure to improve investment decisions.  
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Despite the usefulness of risk disclosures, readability problem---annual reports are 
hard to read, still continue in today.  ‘Readability ĂŶĚŽďĨƵƐĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƌŝƐŬĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƐ ?
pointed out by Linsley and Lawrence (2007), explains that the publication of risk 
disclosure associated regulation has not necessarily improved the quality of risk 
information within company reports. Then, they find that the quality of risk 
disclosure will be influenced by lack of forward-looking type information because 
forward-looking information is more valuable for investors to evaluate company risk 
profile.In fact, it is more difficult for company to disclose forward-looking information 
than current risk information because it is hard to predict future activities. Dietrich et 
al (2001) also suggest market efficiency can be improved by releasing 
forward-looking risk type information.  
 
Beretta and Bozzonlan (2004) test company size and industry in relation to risk 
disclosures and conclude the two variables have no influence on the extent of 
disclosure. But they failed to conclusively prove the association between these 
variations. Similarly, Linsley and Shrives (2006) examined the relationship between 
company size, level of risk and the extent of risk disclosure. Then, they find there is a 
positive correlation between size and disclosure but no correlation between level of 
risk and risk disclosure. Their results are limited because there are many factors they 
did not think about, such as industry impacts. The overviews of those notable risk 
disclosure studies provide me a general idea about the relationships between risk 
disclosure and risk variables and some errors which could be avoided.  
18 
 
2.3 Risk reporting legislation in the United States 
There are minimal risk disclosure requirements in different areas. These 
requirements on risk disclosures are considered to be mandatory disclosure and are 
deliberated by policymaking bodies. In order to keep on ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
reliability and relevance, international standards must contain high quality to 
enhance those auditing information. The policymaking bodies such as the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) are permitted to set U.S. financial reporting standard, because 
they are leaders in the accountancy profession for long time. Their unique position 
will better serve investor interests in USA by influencing the development of 
international standard. Additionally, the responsibilities of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) are making converagence to a single set of 
global accounting standards for public companies a success. 
 
/ŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁŝƚŚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐŚĂƐƚĂŬĞŶĂ rather 
different direction from UK in that whilst it is generally accepted that accounting 
standards have economic consequences, it has also been authoritatively argued that 
ƚŚĞƐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŵĂƚƚĞƌƐĨŽƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐĞƚƚĞƌƐ ? ?ƌŽŵǁŝĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?tith 
this view, the history of USA, perhaps, seems to have more sophisticated and more 
ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŚĂŶ ŵŽƐƚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ   ‘ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ
ůŽďďǇŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŵŝƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůŝŬĞůǇ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ? 
However, this will not prevent the development of accounting standards for 
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ĚŝƐĐůŽƐŝŶŐƌŝƐŬƐ ?  ‘^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐĞƚƚĞƌƐǁŚŽǁŝƐŚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞǁŚĂƚŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞƐĞĞĂƐĂŶ
extra incentive for the acceptance of current cost accounting could only lobby 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ƌŽŵǁŝĐŚ ? ? ?92).  
 
FASB (2001) concludes that there are six factors of disclosing information in US 
companies:  ‘financial and non-ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĚĂƚĂ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĂŶĚ
non-financial data; forward-looking information; information on managers and 
stakeholders; intangible-asset dimension; and company background ?. The annual 
report document is required to ŚĂǀĞ  ‘ƌŝƐŬ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚis designed for the 
company or its relevant industry and makes an offering speculative or one of high 
risks. It is important to notice that risk factors in the annual reports are listed by 
encouraging companies not requiring them. For example, it is freedom for companies 
to publish their absence of profitable operations in recent periods or their financial 
performance in the market, and so on.  
 
ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŝĞƐ ? ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƚŚĞ
ĨŽĐƵƐŽĨDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚŶĂůǇƐŝƐ of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations (MD&A&O),failure of doing so would result in the situation that financial 
information released may not be indicative of future (Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, 1997). Then,  ‘all companies with market 
capitalizations of more than $2.5 billion on January 28, 1997, and all banks and thrifts 
of any size market capitalization, must provide the quantitative and qualitative 
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information in fillings that include audited financial statements of fiscal years ended 
after June 15, 1997 ?. Disclosure requirements relate to qualitative and quantitative 
disclosure of market risk will supplement some information disclosures such as the 
possible costs. Later, Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR 48) issued in 1997, 
requires SEC to register those disclosure requirements in the notes to the accounts 
and also in MD&A&O section. In addition, FASB has provided some guidelines to 
encourage companies to make voluntary disclosures in MD&A&O section of the 
annual reports. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) is a ? United States federal law enacted on July 30, 2002, 
as a reaction to a number of corporate and accounting scandals including those 
affecting Tyco International, Adelphia and Peregrine Systems and so on ?. The aim of 
establishing this legislation is to set enhanced standards for all U.S. public company 
boards, management and public accounting firms. In order to comply with the new 
law, SEC implemented dozens of rules on requirements from SOX. Within the SOX Act, 
every non-American company listing on US stock market should conform to the 
provisions of this Act without any exceptions (Comes-Thuelin, et al., 2006). 
Disclosures required from the SOX Act can be summarized into two parts: one is 
Accuracy of Financial Reports; the other is Off-Balance Sheet Transactions.  
 
 
 
21 
 
2.4 Risk disclosure debates in the United States of America 
Although financial statements are considered to lack adequate disclosures about 
risks and uncertainties ? ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ Ɛƚŝůů ŚĂƐ ƚŽ ĚĞƉĞŶĚ ƉĂƌƚůǇ ŽŶ ƚŚŽƐĞ
statements from annual reports. That is, the AICPA (1987,3) report explains: 
 ‘ Recognising that a riskier business climate equates to a riskier investment climate, 
users increasingly are demanding that financial statements include more information 
so as to help them assess the risks and uncertainties concerning a business 
ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞĐĂƐŚĨůŽǁƐĂŶĚƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?.  
 
Ten years later, Schrand and Elliott (1998) document American Accounting 
Association/Financial Accounting Standards Board (AAA/FASB) 1997 conference 
debates that suggested US companies were providing insufficient risk information 
within their annual reports. Of later, however, shareholders in Enron and WorldCom 
ŽŵƉĂŶǇ ƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚ ŚĞĂǀǇ ůŽƐƐĞƐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ĨƌĂƵĚƵůĞŶƚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ
practices. In the wake of those corporate scandals, there has been an increased 
demand for more disclosures, particularly in the non-financial segment of the annual 
report (Cole and Jones, 2005).In addition, Linsley and Shrives (2005) find that  ‘annual 
report remains a key information source even though companies now release more 
risk information into the public domain than ever before via press releases, corporate 
web sites, and other forms of communication in UK ?. Thus, the reliability of risk 
information in annual reports is still a hot debate when making appropriate 
ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? 
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CHARPTER 3. Hypotheses development 
Based on the theoretical considerations and my own speculation, there are several 
hypotheses were developed. However, no prior published studies have examined and 
compared the changes of risk disclosures in the same industry in USA. For example, 
health care companies may differ in their risk outlooks from Information Technology 
companies and this could influence the volume of risk disclosures in the annual 
reports. Therefore, changes of risk disclosure among different companies will be 
compared in their specific industry. To some extent, some unpredicted errors which 
ĂƌĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƚǇƉĞ ǁŝůů ďĞƌĞŵŽǀĞĚ from industry 
classification. All of these hypotheses are stated in a direct way so as to indicate the 
expected sign of each relationship. The focus of the study is to test five main research 
questions:  
1. /Ɛ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂŶǇ ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ Ă ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƐŝǌĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ǀŽůƵŵĞ ŽĨ ƌŝƐŬ
disclosure information in its annual report in the same industry? 
2. Is there any correlatiŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐůĞǀĞůŽĨƌŝƐŬĂŶĚƚŚĞǀŽůƵŵĞŽĨ
risk disclosure information in its annual report in the same industry? 
3. Is there any correlation between well or underperformed companies and the 
volume of risk disclosure information in its annual report in the same 
industry? 
4. Is there any correlation between industry and the volume of risk information? 
5. Is there a significant increasing trend on the volume of risk disclosure 
information through year 2004-2008 in the same industry? 
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Question 1. Risk disclosure and company size 
According to previous general disclosure studies, Hossain et al. (1995) find that there 
is a positive association between company size and the total number of risk 
disclosures for sample of non-UK companies, and then Linsley and Shrives (2006) find 
a similar relationship in UK company studies. Several arguments linking size to 
disclosure can be also used to describe that larger companies are supposed to have 
less cost on additional disclosure than smaller ones. For example,  ‘larger companies 
are considered to show more risk disclosures ? ? ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ďǇ tĂƚƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŵŵĞƌŵĂŶ
(1990). Because more disclosures about risk will reduce political costs and then 
ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞůĂƌŐĞƌĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ƉƵďůŝĐĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? Therefore, it can be hypothesised that 
a positive relationship between company size and volume of disclosures should also 
hold true for the risk disclosures of U.S. non-financial companies within S&P 500. 
That is: 
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between company size 
and the total number of risk disclosures in the same industry. 
 
As noted by Foster [1986, p.44],  ‘the variable most consistently reported as 
significant in studies examining differences across firms in their disclosure policy is 
ĨŝƌŵƐŝǌĞ ?. Two variables are used to measure this important item according to Linsley 
and Shrives (2006). One is market value (MarkV) and the other is turnover ratio 
(Turn0). Theoretically, the market value of debt is the total of the market value of 
equity plus the market value of debt. However, obtaining the market value of debt is 
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problematic and empirical studies typically use the book value of debt (see e.g. Dessi 
and Robertson, 2003). I follow this practice and define the market value of the firm 
as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. The market value of equity 
can be calculated as an average price over the fiscal year or the price at year end, I 
use the latter because the former is unavailable. The market value variable will be 
converted into its natural logarithm in the regression because of nonlinearly 
characteristic.       
 
Turnover ratio (TurnO) can be defined as a measure of the frequency a ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
inventory is replaced during a specific time period (see e.g. Weston and 
Copeland ,1988). Following with this practice, I calculate the ratio of sales to 
inventory which measures the turnover of stock as cost of goods sold divided by 
average inventory during the time period. Additionally, market capitalization (capita), 
which is total value of the shares of a company, is also added in, because this variable 
will be useful to measure company size by calculating for sectors and stock markets. 
The estimating equation also includes two industry dummies: Indust1 represents 
Information Technology; Indust2 represents Industrials. 
Incorporating all mentioned independent variables, the regression model 1 for 
hypothesis1 is as follows: 
    Risk disclosure ݅ݐ =ɴ0 + ɴ1TurnOit + ɴ2MarkVit + ɴ3Capitait + ɴ4Indust2it + ɴ5Indust3it + ɸit        (1) 
Where ɴ
1
 ?ĂŶĚ ɴ
4
 represent regression coefficients and  represents the error 
term. i and t index firm and year respectively.  
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Question 2. Risk disclosure and level of company risk 
It is generally believed that companies with higher levels of risk, such as Microsoft 
Corporation and so forth, will disclose greater amounts of risk information. Their 
higher risk need to be explained more details to shareholders and the wider 
stakeholder community. For example, the ICAEW (1999) considered that the 
ŵĂƌŬĞƚƉůĂĐĞ ĐĂŶ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƌŝƐŬ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ďǇ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐŝŶŐ ŵŽƌĞ
risk information. Then level of company risk may be influenced by the increased risk 
disclosure to some extent. 
 
On the other hand, companies with lower levels of risk may also be preferred to 
disclose risk information because of the nature of their business activities and the 
advantages of disclosing risk information. By contrast, companies with higher levels 
of risk may not prefer to focus ŽŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ƌŝƐŬŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?In addition, the type of risk 
disclosure may have different nature with risk levels. Then, the null form might be a 
postulation that there is a positive association between risk disclosures and risk 
levels. That is: 
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris Paribus, there is positive relationship between the level of risk 
within a company and the total number of risk disclosures. 
 
Gearing ratio is a variable which assesses risk within companies or industries. Weston 
and Copeland (1998) definite gearing ratio (Gearin) as a measure of financial leverage, 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚĂ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ĨƵŶĚĞĚďǇ ŽǁŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ĨƵŶĚƐ
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ǀĞƌƐƵƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌ ?ƐĨƵŶĚƐŝŶ ?/ĨĞĐŽŶŽŵǇŝƐŝŶĂrecession, companies with higher gearing 
ratios might have more risk of loss in the same industry. As there are many sets of 
ƌĂƚŝŽƐ ĨŽƌ ŐĞĂƌŝŶŐ ? / ƵƐĞ ĚĞďƚ ƌĂƚŝŽ  ‘ƚŽƚĂů ĚĞďƚ ĚŝǀŝĚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŽƚĂů ĂƐƐĞƚ ? ƚŽ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ
gearing ratio according to Weston and Copeland (1988). I follow the practice of 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) and add another two variables to measure level of risk. 
They are: Beta factor and Book to market value of equity. Linsley and Shrives (2006) 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĂƚĞƚĂĨĂĐƚŽƌ  ?ĞƚĂ )ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ  ‘ƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌ ƐŬŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞƐ
ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŽŽŬƚŽDĂƌŬĞƚǀĂůƵĞŽĨĞƋƵŝƚǇ(BMequi) 
ŝƐĐŚŽƐĞŶƚŽŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨďĞƚĂĨĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐŵŽĚĞů. 
 
Incorporating all mentioned independent variables, the regression model 2 for 
Hypothesis2 is as follows: 
=         (2) 
Where  ?ĂŶĚ  represent regression coefficients and  represents the error term. 
i and t index firm and year respectively. ĂĐŚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ?ƐƉƌŽǆǇĐŽĚĞǁŝůůďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ
in Table 1. 
Table 1,ǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐ ?ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ?ƉƌŽǆŝĞƐĂŶĚĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ 
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Question 3. Company performance 
ŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ŝƐ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƚŽ ďĞ Ğǀaluated by profitability ratio. The 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ĂƐ ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ
compared with its total expense incurred during the same period of time. In other 
words, a company is doing well if it has a higher profitability ratio than competitors. 
However, some industries may have seasonable characteristic in their operations. 
Consumer discretionary industry, for example, typically experience higher revenues 
for official holiday such as Christmas. According to Comparability Principle, each 
profitability ratio will be averaged in each year. The null hypothesis can be considered 
as: 
Hypothesis 3. Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between company 
performance and the total number of risk disclosures. 
 
After reading many annual reports between 2004 and 2008, there are a few 
companies disclose common financial measures for five years. That is, it is difficult for 
readers to examine trends. Thus, the profitability ratios such as dividends per share 
(DPS), profit margin (ProM), return on equity (ROE) and are calculated manually if it 
is necessary. Profitability is the net result of many policies and decisions. Whereas, 
each of its ratios reveal interesting things about the operational ways in a company. 
Finally, Weston& Copeland (1988) give answers about how effectively the company is 
being managed by ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? 
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Thus, I calculate Profit margin on sales as dividing net income after taxes by sales in 
this study according to the explanations of Weston & Copeland (1988). Additionally, 
they define ROE to be net income divided by total equity. Some industries have low 
ROE because they require large infrastructure builds before generating profits, such 
as manufacturing firms, but some industries do not require much property to 
generate earnings, such as advertising firms. Thus, companies with high ROE might 
also make bad investments. However, I choose ROE because it is proper to compare 
the company performance in the same industry. 
 
Incorporating all mentioned independent variables, the regression model 3 for 
Hypothesis 3 is as follows: 
=            (3) 
Where  ?ĂŶĚ  represent regression coefficients and  represents the error term. 
i and t index firm and year respectively. ĂĐŚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ?ƐƉƌŽǆǇĐŽĚĞǁŝůůďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ
in Table 1. 
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CHARPTER 4. Methodology 
4.1Sample selection  
Table 2 shows the sample companies broken down by industry after having collapsed 
the ten GICS industry categories into three. Following with the explanations from 
Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) and Linsley & Shrives (2006), the financial companies are 
removed because of their complicated financial nature. Year period (between 
December 2004 and December 2008) is chosen for the following two reasons. First, 
2008, as troughs of financial crisis, follows an episode of significant stock market 
decline and volatility, and thus may coincide with listed firms placing greater value on 
risk disclosure. During the five examined years, the world economic has changed 
dramatically from bloom to depression and comes up from low tide slowly. The 
changes which happed in this period have significant value on research; Second, 2008 
marks the inception of commercial availability of highly disaggregated share 
ownership data because the whole atrophic economy need to be reformed; The 
sample companies are selected from the S&P 500 index which is a market 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁĞŝŐŚƚĞĚŝŶĚĞǆƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĨŝƌŵƐ ?ŵĂƌŬĞƚǀĂůƵĞƌĂŶŬĞĚ ?-500 in USA. 
Table 2 Sample companies 
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In addition, the S&P 500 is classified into ten different industries according to Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) (see Figure 1). GICS has been specifically 
designed to classify companies globally  W in both developed and developing 
economies. Compared with classification system ICB, GICS is better to be used in 
ŵŽƐƚ ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ  ? WŽŽƌ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ĂŶ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ĐůĂƐƐification system. 
Finally, three industries are randomly selected from the ten different classification 
groups of GICS. They are Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology and 
Industrials. The weight of the three industries is 37.2% in the total S&P GICS sectors. 
After deciding the three industries ? sample, 5 firms are selected from each of them. 
To sum up, the sample data has 75 annual report observations in total. 
 
Figure 1 S&P Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) Sectors-Weighted 
 
Source from Stock Maven Research Center, available at http://www.stockmaven.com/sectorsSP500w.htm 
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4.2 Sample limitations 
Before analysing the sample data, it is important to explicit the limitations of 
collected data because they might influence the results of the following analysis.  
1. This study is limited to companies listed on the Standard & Poor 500 which cannot 
represent all firms in USA. Then, the sample selected in this study is further limited 
by 15 companies in S&P 500.  
2. The selected companies are restricted to 5-year financial data for the period from 
2004 to 2008. It did not display the whole picture for each company.  
3. All of the samples are selected from non-financial industries. This study ignores the 
influences from the nature of finance-related industry which is significantly different 
from non-financial one. 
4. There are 75 observations in sample data. As it is a comparatively small sample, 
the results of running statistical technology might be somewhat biased. 
 
4.3 Method of analysis and its limitations 
There are many kinds of methods available for analysing risk disclosure information 
in the annual reports. For this study, content analysis approach is chosen as it has 
been used in many previous disclosure studies, such as Linsley and Shrives (2006) 
and so on.  ‘Content analysis is a method of codifying the text (or content) of a piece 
of writing into various groups (or categories) depending on selected criteria ? (Weber, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ? ‘dŚŝƐŝƐĂŵŽƌĞƌĞůŝĂďůĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ? ?DŝůŶĞĂŶĚĚůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? )
considered. During collecting data process, I have to read each annual report  and 
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identify all sentences which have disclosed risk information. In special, not every 
 ‘ƌŝƐŬ ?ǁŝůů ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŐŝǀĞŶ ƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞ ĨŽƵŶĚŽƵƚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?
sentences will be coded into different risk disclosure classifications if I think that they 
are related with risks or to have influence on company risks in future according to the 
decision rules of risk disclosures which are provided by Linsley and Shrives (2006) 
(See Appendix B).    
 
As mentioned in literature review chapter, risk information in this study would be 
placed into one of six risk categories: financial risk, operations risk, empowerment 
risk, information processing and technology risk, integrity risk, and strategic risk. The 
future details are displayed in Appendix A.  Milne and Adler (1999) concluded that 
 ‘Reliability in content analysis involves two separate but related issues ?. First, in order 
to demonstrate the reliability of data set, I have to prove that I has already 
undergone a sufficient period of training because I am a single coder for this study. If 
the pilot sample coded by me shows that my training results have reached an 
acceptable level, I will code the main data set in the next step. Secondly, the 
reliability of the coding instruments also should be assured. With a reliable coding 
instrument, inexperienced coders can also produce few differences, if the categories 
and decision rules which are used in this sample collection process are well-specified. 
In order to improve the reliability of the study I code the first three annual reports 
and then repeat again one week later. Table3 gives a description of the example 
when coding risk disclosures. After three weeks, I plan to go on collecting full data 
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under the well-specified categories and decision rules which are made by previous 
excellent researchers, if the two coding tests are achieved consistently. However, 
those protective measures make important contributions to reduce personal errors. 
Finally, the data is considered to be reliable on a certain accepted level in this study. 
 
Table3 Typical examples of risk disclosures 
company Risk  disclosure  example   Risk  
category 
Amazon 
 
 ‘/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĂŶǇ ũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞ  “ĂƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚ  “ĂƵĐƚŝŽŶĞĞƌƐ ?
and may regulate online auction services. Jurisdictions may also regulate other 
consumer-to-consumer online markets, including certain aspects of Amazon 
Marketplace. This could, in turn, diminish the demand for our products and 
services and increase our cost of doing business. Amazon, 2004, p25 
Operational 
risk 
GANNETT 
CO 
 ‘ĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽŐƌŽǁĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŝƚŚƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞ
subscribers to pay by credit card over longer periods. These efforts successfully 
counter the aftereffects of the Do Not Call Registry and the decline in 
ƚĞůĞŵĂƌŬĞƚŝŶŐĂƐĂǁĂǇƚŽƐĞůůŽƵƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ? ‘'EEdK ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 
Strategic 
risk 
Masco 
Corp 
 ‘/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŽŵƉĂŶǇŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚ ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶŽĨĐĂƐŚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶĞƚĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ
financial investment and $179 million from the net disposition of certain 
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐ ? ?DĂƐĐŽŽƌƉ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 
Financial 
risk 
Source from the annual reports in each company fiscal years 
 
Limitations 
Content analysis, as a research method, still has some limitations. Although the 
coding procedure is carried strictly, the errors caused by the absent of second coder 
cannot be avoided. The bias due to the subjectivity of the content analysis and 
statistical technology cannot be wholly omitted at all. Therefore, it is important to 
define an acceptable level of reliability because there is no single solution for many 
problems in content analysis (Holsti, 1969). 
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Chapter 5. Results and Analysis 
5.1 hypothesis testing  
Before doing descriptive statistics, the data file has been firstly checked errors, and 
then no out-of-range values on any of the variables have been found. Overall the 
mean disclosure rate per report is 54 sentences. Table 4 reports aůů ƚŚĞ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ?
Skewness are positive, which indicates that scores clustered to the left at the low 
values. The kurtosis values of MarV, Capita, Gearin, Beta BMequi and ProM are all 
negative and below 0 which indicates their distribution are relatively flat. In addition, 
the Kurtosis of TurnO is positive and indicates that its distribution is clustered in the 
centre. Different distributions indicate variables are not having the same changing 
trend due to variables ? own nature. The standard deviation on ROE is significantly 
larger than the other types of independent variables. This indicates that the ROE data 
are spread out over a large range of values. Information displayed in table5 indicates 
that there is no violation of assumptions on carrying out the statistical techniques 
such as Pearson correlation, which explores the relationship between two variables 
in small sample, is proper to be used in this study. 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics 
 
35 
 
   
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between company 
size and the total number of risk disclosures in the same industry. 
 
According to analysis method of Linsley and Shrives (2006), Pearson correlation 
coefficients, which tests estimating equation (1), are reported in Table 5. Turnover 
ratio is negatively correlated with risk disclosure, although its value in consumer 
discretionary, information technology and industries are in medium size (0.30-0.49), 
large size (0.50-1.0) and small size (0.10-0.29) respectively (Cohen, 1988). Larger 
correlation coefficient would suggest a stronger relationship between the variables, 
whereas the negative sign refers only to the direction of the relationship, not the 
strength. One of the reasons for insignificantly (0.701, p>0.05) negative (-0.081) 
Turnover ratio in Industrials might be that inventory replaced frequency is common 
lower than in the other industry, such as the demand of aircraft compared with food 
consumption because aircrafts, as unnecessary product, need a longer replaced time 
period than easily-consumed products do. 
Table 5 Pearson correlation co-efficient for variables 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Market capitalisation variable in Pearson correlation is only significantly (0.001, 
p<0.05) positive (0.601) in industrials. While it is possible to argue that larger firms 
will have higher value of publicly tradable part in the company because Market 
capitalisation is one of the important factors to determine stock valuation. The 
insignificant coefficients of Market capitalization in both Consumer Discretionary and 
Information Technology industry might indicate that the stock prices in both the two 
industries are sensible and will be easier moved by speculation about changes in 
expectations about profits. Market value variable in Pearson correlation is 
significantly positive in three industries, and it also has high percentage of 
determination in each industry which means this variable can explain a respectable 
amount of variance for the dependent variable. 
 
As this study is given a static panel data set, further analysis of the sample is 
conducted by using one of the two competing methods to estimate the pooled 
regression models: One is Within transformation; the other is First-difference 
transformation. Both of them can eliminate the problem of correlated effects that 
might generate from the correlation between independent variables and firm 
heterogeneity. Wooldrige (2006) argues that both methods are identical when T=2. 
When T>3, for small N and small T, the choice between the two transformations 
hinges on the relative efficiency of the estimators. If there is any correlation between 
 and regressor, within transformation is more efficient than first-difference 
transformation, otherwise first-difference transformation is more favorable.  
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The null hypothesis is that no correlation between  and repressors. Firstly, panel 
data is declared before using any Stata ?s powerful  “xt ? command; secondly, the fixed 
effects estimation of function (1) is accomplished using the xtreg command with the 
option fe. The new variable  ‘_est_fixed ? is added in database and stored by 
commanding  ‘est store fixed ? (Appendix C); finally, estimated function (1) is estimated 
by random effect model. After that, Hausman test is used to compare the coefficient 
estimates from fixed effects model to those from random effects model (Adkins and 
Hill, 2008). The probability of chi-square in Hausman test is 0.1168 (p>0.05) 
(Appendix C). Thus, the null hypothesis is not rejected. That is, first-difference 
transformation is more efficient to estimate regression model (1). Random effect 
model has 23% R-Square which indicates that the model fit is explained well by 
random effect model. 
 
Table 6 The outcomes from random effects estimated model 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
The results which came from random fixed effect model are reported in Table 6 
because fixed effect estimator is inconsistent in estimated function (1). In other 
words, the random effects estimator is possible to converge the true parameter value. 
The p-value of turnover coefficient is 0.019 which is insignificant (0.957, p>0.05). It 
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indicates that larger companies will disclose more risks which is opposite to the result 
from Pearson Correlation. However, this turnover coefficient is probably inconsistent 
with risk disclosure because it is insignificant due to the statistical limitations. Market 
value variable is significantly (0.04, p<0.05) positive (11.73), while market 
capitalisation is significantly (0.000, p<0.05) negative (-13). The regression result 
indicates that company size will have different relationship with risk disclosures if it is 
measured by different factors ĚƵĞ ƚŽŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƌƐ ? ŽǁŶcharacteristic and limitations 
(i.e. market value will not be influenced by stock market as much as market 
capitalisation). This is inconsistent with the results from Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients. 
 
Consumer Discretionary is the base group in the three industries. The rest two 
industries are added in regression equation (1) as dummy variables in order to avoid 
perfect multicollinearity. As the intercept is the same for each industry in regression 
model (1), it will be ignored when finding differences between industries. The 
coefficient of dummy variable Indust2 indicates that the volume of risk disclosures in 
Information Technology is 34.96 times higher than in Consumer Discretionary, ceteris 
paribus. The difference on the volume of risk disclosures between Consumer 
Discretionary and Industrials is very significant because t= (-10.9)/0.251= (-43.43). 
The volume of risk disclosures in Consumer Discretionary is -10.9 times less than in 
Industrials. I think this results are caused either from industry own characteristic or 
social environment factors such as policy requirements. 
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Summary and findings 
There is no unified estimated result to reject or accept Hypothesis 1 after running 
two analysis methods because the three explanatory variables cannot provide the 
same relationship with risk disclosures in the same industry. However, each of the 
relationship provided by measure variables still has its own meaning. Perhaps this 
reflects the  ‘one reality  Wtwo stories ? phenomenon in corporate finance research ? 
(Barclay and Smith, 2005) and the inevitable errors from the calculating limitation of 
each statistical technology. For instance, companies with larger turnover ratio have 
disclosed less risk-related information overall than companies with capitalisation had 
during the examined five years.  
 
This finding is inconsistent with previous literature reviews on the potential impacts 
for company size such as Lang and Lundholm (1993), Hossain et al. (1995), Beretta 
and Bozzolan ?s (2004) and Linsley & Shrives (2006). For example, Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) consider that larger firms and riskier firms report more financial risk. 
Consistent with expectations, and Linsley & Shrives (2006) discuss the relationship 
between company size and risk disclosure was positive for 79 UK companies ? annual 
reports. They think that large companies face more stakeholder groups and have 
more resources that enable them to develop relevant strategies and make such 
disclosures. Deegan and Unerman (2006) conclude Edward Freeman ?s stakeholder 
theory and legitimacy theory which suggest corporations need to meet the 
expectation of society and take into consideration all associated stakeholder groups.  
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However, small companies also have incentive to disclose more risk disclosures 
because they can obtain more public confidence by doing that. But large companies 
sometimes might not choose to disclose more risks information as their directors 
have more complicated considerations such as pressure from large shareholder or 
stakeholder group, and existing reputation in the market, and so on.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between the level of 
risk within a company and the total number of risk disclosures in the same industry. 
 
Table 7 reports results from Pearson correlation. Gearing ratio has different signs in 
different industries. Moving down Table 7 from top to bottom, the correlation of 
gearing ratio in Information technology is statistically insignificant (0.091, p>0.05) 
and negative (-0.346) while it is significantly positive in the other two industries. In 
addition, the percentage of determination of gearing ratio is low in Consumer 
Discretionary (1.1%) and industries (6.1%). Thus, there is not much overlap between 
gearing ratio and the total volume of risk disclosures. Perhaps firms in the two 
industries always have lower leverage than Information Technology which has a 
percentage of determination at 12% so that respectable level for gearing ratio to 
explain risk disclosures is reduced. However, the different signs of gearing ratio 
coefficients suggest that the relationship between level of company risk and risk 
disclosures is influenced by industry factor because each industry has its own 
leverage requirements standard according to its industry nature.  
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Table 7 Pearson correlation co-efficient for variables 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Beta variable in Pearson Correlation has insignificantly (0.337, p>0.05) negative (-0.2) 
relationship with the total volume of risk disclosures in Consumer Discretionary 
industry. It has insignificantly positive relationship with risk disclosures in Information 
Technology and Industrials. 
 
Book to Market value of equity variable is insignificantly (0.885, p>0.05) positive 
(0.03) in industrials, but is negative in the rest two industries. Those results suggest 
that risk disclosure might be influenced by beta and Book to Market value of equity 
in the five examined years in the same industry, but the two variables cannot explain 
the relationship between level of risk and risk disclosures very well in regression 
function (1) due to the sample and technology limitations. 
 
Table 8 The outcomes from fixed effects estimated model 
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After estimating function (2), the probability of chi-square in Hausman test is 0.0000 
(p<0.05) (Appendix D) and the H null is rejected. Thus, fixed effects estimated model 
is preferred in regressing function (2). Table 8 shows the outcomes from fixed effects 
model. With a very low model R-square (0.0775), only gearing ratio and Book to 
Market value of equity are calculated in fixed effects model, but all the rest variables 
are dropped automatically. The coefficients of both Gearing ratio and Book to Market 
value of equity are insignificant positive at the 5% significance level.  
 
Summary and findings 
Each relationship between risk measure and the volume of risk disclosures is valuable 
to be examined, although the correlation coefficients for the three risk measures 
indicate that no significant association exists between level of risk measures and the 
volume of risk disclosures in the same industry.  
 
This finding supports the previous literature review on the potential impacts of level 
of risk, such as Linsley & Shrives (2006). They consider the stakeholders are provided 
with insufficient risk information by companies, particularly, by those companies with 
lower level of risk. Their opinions are also limited to some extent because industry 
nature will have impacts on assessment of company risk level. Besides, company risk 
level itself is difficult to be evaluated. Thus, I think the results of hypothesis2 can be 
accepted in a acceptance level because there is no perfect research methods to 
measure this relationship at present. 
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Hypothesis 3. Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between the 
company performance and the total number of risk disclosures in the same industry. 
 
As shown in Table 9, the magnitudes of the coefficients on Profit Margin in three 
industries are having different sign (-0.599, 0.67,-0.155, respectively). In Consumer 
Discretionary industry, for example, the total number of risk disclosure will decrease 
0.599 if the Profit Margin increases one unit, ceteris paribus. With a high percentage 
of determination (35.90%), this significant coefficient of Profit Margin can explain the 
relationship between risk disclosure and company performance well. However, this 
result cannot fit for the situation of Information Technology which has absolutely 
opposite relationship between the two variables, which is insignificantly (0.091, 
p>0.05) positive (0.67). 
Table 9 Pearson correlation co-efficient for variables 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
DPS variable is insignificantly (0.522, p>0.05) negative (-0.0134) correlated with risk 
disclosures in Consumer Discretionary, but significantly (0.000, p<0.05) positive 
(0.712, p>0.05) in Industrials and missing value in Information Technology. Most 
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companies will not cut dividend unless their capital structure or business has been 
changed or their financial condition demands, such as their profits cannot pay for 
dividends. Additionally, the coefficients of ROE are insignificant negative in three 
industries. Thus, good performance company will tend to disclose less risk 
information if it is only measured by ROE. Despite the influence of industry nature, 
some other uncertainties might also affect the relationships, such as ratio calculation 
errors or changes in economic environment. 
 
A Hausman test of the fixed effects method versus the random effects method 
indicates that random effect model is preferred to be used in regression function (3) 
because the probability of chi-square in Hausman test is 0.2265 (p>0.05) (Appendix 
E). The R-Square of model fit is comparatively small (0.1185). The volume of risk 
disclosure will reduce by 0.15 if Profit Margin increases one unit, ceteris paribus. 
Nevertheless, Dividend per share has a significant (0.037, p<0.05) positive (9.63) 
coefficient. ROE has a very small coefficient which is insignificantly (0.789, p>0.05) 
positive (0.0002) in Table 10. The coefficients of the two dummy variables indicates 
the differences on the volume of risk disclosures among industries are significant. 
  
Table 10 The outcomes from random effects estimated model 
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Summary and findings 
Disclosures about almost three performance measures are poor. This finding does 
not prove the opinions of previous literature reviews on the potential impacts for 
company performance brought by risk disclosures such as Linsley & Shrives (2005). 
They point out that one important benefit of risk disclosure is that companies can 
obtain opportunity to recognise and analyse risk information which relates to 
company performance. Hence, this benefit encourages companies to take responses 
to reduce the negative impacts and increase opportunities for business gains so that 
they can get a better business performance. However, this consequence cannot 
come into existence in reverse. It does not mean that a better performance company 
has disclosed more risk disclosures in its annual reports.  
 
Research question 4. Is there any correlation between industry and the volume 
of risk information? 
 
Pearson Correlation measures linear relationship between two variables and for any 
relationship to exist, any change in one variable will lead to a constant proportional 
change in the other one. However, it does not mean that they are responsible for 
each other. If the relationship is not linear then the result is inaccurate. In other 
words, if there is categorical data, such as gender or work status, the correlation will 
be meaningless. However, industry data is one of the categorical data. Thus, the 
relationship between industries cannot be estimated by Pearson correlation in this 
study when analysing Question 4.  
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In Question 4, industries differences are taken into account in testing the volume of 
risk disclosures in firm ?s annual reports. The volume of risk disclosure is summed up 
from 2004-2008 for each firm. Table 11 shows the differences in the volume of risk 
disclosures among the fifteen companies in three different industries from 
2004-2008. In all three industries, Information Technology discloses about twice 
higher volume of risk than industrials. The total volume of risk disclosure in 
Consumer Discretionary is twenty percent higher than in industrials but sixty percent 
lower than in information technology.  
 
Table 11 Industry Difference in Determining Risk Disclosures Volume 
- 
 
Amran (2006) considers that the nature of a company does have impact on its 
disclosure. Some industries may face higher institutional pressures than the others. 
That is, companies which operate in different industries are possible to experience 
different kinds of risk. Companies in one industry may be required to increase their 
risk disclosure in order to align its special regulations due to its industry nature. The 
47 
 
organisation ?s decision of adjusting market environmental programs would be 
affected by industry-specific factors, too. Previous analysis results in Hypothesis1,and 
3 both show that the differences on the volume of risk disclosures between 
industries are significant which can also be examined directly from Table12 . Thus, 
the industry has impacts on the risk disclosures because each of them has different 
total volume of risk disclosures. I think there is a significant relationship between the 
total volume of risk disclosure and industry although there is no evidence to 
demonstrate the specific impacts of industry nature in this study.  
 
Summary and findings 
As different industries face different types of risks, published regulations and 
frameworks play important role in improving the communication process between 
shareholders and outsiders effectively. One possible explanation of the above result 
is that companies in different industries tend to have different emphasis on types of 
risk. For example, the information technology industry has the characteristic of a 
higher leverage than the other two industries.  
 
Most companies in Information Technology have made a fairly amount of disclosures 
on this financial aspect. Yahoo, for example, provides detailed information on 
operational risks and how it has been managed, which include how is the product 
performance has been achieved, whether it meets business environment. Aother two 
companies, such as google and Verisign Inc, both describe the market to be highly 
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competitive to drive because of rapid changes of technology and new product 
requirements. In contrast, companies in consumer discretionary generally provide 
less information on environmental aspect, but stress more emphasis on the issue of 
strategic risk, which includes risks such as business portfolio, environmental scan and 
so on. In addition, the decision of disclosing risk information is also depending on the 
scope and scale of operation in a company. The results of making decisions about 
disclosing risk information will influence the weight differently on issues such as 
acquisition and customer satisfaction. 
 
Research question 5 Is there a significant increasing trend on the volume of risk 
disclosure information through year 2004-2008 in the same industry? 
 
Overall, the result in Figure2 shows the total volume for risk disclosures in 
companies ? annual reports have raised steadily from financial year 2004-2008. The 
level of increasing volume from 2007 to 2008 for all three industries is the lowest 
than the other four years, although the continued improvement in every two 
successive years is not significant. In contrast, each industry shows a significant 
increase in 2008 which is more than 10 percent of the total volume of risk disclosures 
in 2004. Consumer Discretionary has 40 percent increases in 2008 compared with its 
total volumes in 2004. During the five years, it is obvious that there is a significant 
increasing trend on the volume of risk disclosure information in the same industry. 
This is consistent with Kajuter (2006) who reports that  ‘a continuous increase on the 
risk disclosures of German listed firms from 1999 to 2003 ?.  
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Figure2 total volume of risk disclosure in three 
industries
 
 
Summary and findings 
The increasing trend signifies that firms are increasingly recognising the importance 
of risk reporting practices. Perhaps the new established accounting standards can be 
one possible explanation for the increasing trend of risk disclosures. Morris (2005) 
also mentioned that the revised statement part of Operating and Financial Review 
was issued to be published by quoted companies for financial years in May 2005.  
 
On the other hand, the volume of risk disclosures have significantly increased from 
2004 to 2008, but this does not mean that the quality of these reports has also 
increased. That is, it is still a problem whether the report users are communicated 
with those risks, although companies have generally improved their risk reporting 
practices. In other words, the readability of those disclosed risk in companies ? annual 
report might be low and have not significantly improved through years. Linsley and 
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Lawrence (2007) report that the level of readability of the risk disclosures is difficult, 
although there is no evidence suggests directors are deliberately concealing bad risk 
news through their own writing style within the annual reports. Despite the total 
volume of risk disclosures was increasing through the years in each industry, a few 
bland statements were found to repeat over years. For example, Amazon reports 
nearly 80 percent absolutely same content in risk factor sector from 2005 to 2008. In 
addition, no any further information is provided in explaining the reason of having 
the same risk factors in annual reports.  
 
Other findings 
During the sample selecting process, there are some apparent findings after reading 
those annual reports. Although the findings do not belong to the above five research 
questions, they can help readers to get better focus on how companies disclosing 
their risk information. 
 
1. Most of the companies disclose risk information according to the requirements of 
relevant accounting regulations. Thus, their annual reports always have similar 
risk factors.  
2. Operational risk, financial risks and strategic risks have much higher amounts 
than the rest risk categorsations.  
3. Most of the risk factors only argue round and round without any explanation of 
what measures are taking place. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 limitation of the Study 
The validity and reliability of the results of this study is limited by several factors such 
as time and resources constrain, sample and methodology chosen, and the nature of 
the study. With limited time and resources constrain, the sample size consist only 15 
companies from 3 industries from Standard & Poors 500, which is relatively small for 
the generalization of the findings. Krippendorff (1980) argues that the standards for 
data reliability should be related to the costs of drawing false conclusions (p.147). 
This research is partially based on the Linsley and Shrives (2006) checklists, so the 
local USA stakeholder demand may not be reflect perfectly. 
 
As different companies disclose risk information according to their own degree of 
details, comparisons among companies become difficult for annual report users. It 
might confuse annual report users when the same risk factors are disclosed by 
different emphasis. Those confusion will also be potential threatens to the reliability 
of theoretical foundations. However, there is still no best measures in examining risk 
disclosure top, although lots of important indicators are provided by many authors 
and institutes. Thus, the opinions and results of this study could be used as the basis 
considerations of analysis together with other research materials. 
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6.2 Suggestions for future research 
Although most existing published studies about risk disclosures conclude the positive 
relationship between company size and total volume of risk disclosure, this positive 
relationship is not supported in this study which divided companies into different 
industries. This study might be the first attempt to examine the risk disclosures on 
USA listed companies within the same industry. Thus, the findings, which opposite 
previous studies, need to be perceived with caution, because there still have some 
limitations in both the selected data and research procedure. Most of the results are 
generated according to previous research method and therefore it is worth for 
further research to produce more valuable findings. 
  
The gap in examining the changes in quality of risk disclosures is also valuable for 
future research. As ASB (2007) points out a total of 33 risks and uncertainties are 
found in a company when investigating the quality of narrative financial reporting in 
2006, future research topic can be:  ‘whether quality and readability of annual report 
will increase significantly as the volume of risk disclosures did ? ?or  ‘Will the quality of 
risk disclosure be impacted by the decision of directors in a company? ? Even the 
same study topic can also be analysed by different research methods. It is also 
interesting to examine the same research topic on listed companies in other 
countries or make comparisons among existing research findings so as to improve 
public understandings. Longer time of period or larger sample size can also improve 
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the reliability of standpoints.  
6.3 Conclusion 
Outcomes from Pearson correlations and random effects or fixed effects model 
indicate that there is no clear association with company size, level of risk, or company 
performance in the same industry because no consistent correlation coefficients is 
found out after analysing nine risk measures. This could be due to the difficulties of 
evaluating risk reporting in the annual reports of all the selected listed companies in 
USA. Table12 summarises that the volume of risk disclosures differs in each industry 
but has a significant increasing trend from 2004 to 2008. Although there is no 
evidence to demonstrate the regulation of an industry ?s demand of disclosing risk 
information, the effect of industry nature cannot be ignored anyway. 
  
The result after regressing Hypothesis1 is inconsistent with previous findings which 
suggest company size is positively related with the volume of risk disclosures (see e.g. 
Beretta and Bozzolan ?s, 2004 and so on). It is worth noticing that previous works on 
company size and the risk disclosures did not separate companies into different 
industries. The negative effects generated from different industry natures cannot be 
eliminated. This is one of the important reasons that my results are different from 
previous authors. As shown in Table12, the same sample data gets different testing 
outcomes, after it is tested by different statistical technologies. Thus, despite the 
limitations of the sample data, the technical error is also a critical factor for the 
difference even when both technical methods are fit for the sample analysis.  
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Care need to be taken when analysing data or calculating risk amounts in the annual 
reports. Each of the outcomes in table12 stands for one existing probability for the 
relationship between company size and the volume of risk disclosures in a certain 
accepted significance level. My previous assume about the relationship between 
company performance and the volume of risk disclosures is rejected. It has suggested 
that company performance is not so important when directors make decisions about 
risk disclosures as previous expectations. Company performance is considered to be 
worthwhile only if it satisfied the specific needs of different stakeholder. 
 
Additionally, the increasing number of mandatory disclosures is a critical factor for 
most companies appears to disclose greater amount of risk information in their 
annual reports. Present amount of risk disclosures still cannot satisfy the demand of 
investors or shareholders perfectly. Thus, the increasing demand for better corporate 
governance and transparency in recent years reflects that the existing USA 
regulations on risk reporting have to promote the consistency of forms of disclosure. 
However, it should be noticed that an explicit risk reporting framework is unpractical 
to all companies or industries in reality, because it is a difficult issue to provide 
relevant risk information to multiple stakeholders with a wide diversity of risk 
preference and risk attitude (Hodder et al, 2001). Creation is crucial for either policy 
makers or companies ? risk disclosing ways to gain sustainable development. 
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In summary, the main contribution of this study is that it is one of the first studies 
that investigate the characteristics between companies and risk disclosures from 
industry perspective, using the sample set of S&P 500 firms. The concern of this 
study is to make companies and their activities more comparably by dividing them 
into the same industry. Industry factor does have impacts on ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ƌŝƐŬ
disclosures after analysing above five research questions. It contributes to the 
literature particularly in USA context where risk disclosure practice has much room 
for development. In terms of research method, the results indicate the importance of 
separating the companies in to specific industry because they allowed me to 
distinguish whether industry nature has any impacts on risk disclosure.  
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Appendix A--- risk disclosure categories 
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Appendix B--- Decision rules for risk disclosures 
 
 
Cited from Linsley and Shrives (2006) 
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Appendix C 
Consumer Discretionary---company size 
end of do-file
. 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(14, 56) =    20.83              Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .95164257   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    5.8720316
     sigma_u    26.049159
                                                                              
       _cons     77.04926   23.47236     3.28   0.002     30.02847      124.07
     indust3    (dropped)
     indust2    (dropped)
      capita    -13.38831   3.633429    -3.68   0.001    -20.66694   -6.109674
       markv     9.568026   4.180601     2.29   0.026     1.193276    17.94278
       turno     .2622121   5.675675     0.05   0.963    -11.10753    11.63196
                                                                              
     riskdis        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3211                        Prob > F           =    0.0011
                                                F(3,56)            =      6.16
       overall = 0.0034                                        max =         5
       between = 0.0254                                        avg =       4.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.2482                         Obs per group: min =         4
Group variable: firm                            Number of groups   =        15
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        74
. xtreg  riskdis turno markv capita indust2 indust3, fe
 
end of do-file
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .85189807   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    5.8720316
     sigma_u    14.083216
                                                                              
       _cons     46.10648   20.79247     2.22   0.027      5.35398    86.85898
     indust3    -10.88139   9.485421    -1.15   0.251    -29.47248    7.709691
     indust2     34.96503   9.630693     3.63   0.000     16.08922    53.84084
      capita    -13.03629   3.570965    -3.65   0.000    -20.03526   -6.037333
       markv     11.73057   4.096214     2.86   0.004      3.70214      19.759
       turno     .1888162   3.529102     0.05   0.957    -6.728096    7.105729
                                                                              
     riskdis        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(5)       =     41.60
       overall = 0.6305                                        max =         5
       between = 0.6599                                        avg =       4.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.2305                         Obs per group: min =         4
Group variable: firm                            Number of groups   =        15
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        74
. xtreg riskdis turno markv capita  indust2 indust3, re
 
end of do-file
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0624
                          =        7.32
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      capita     -13.38831    -13.03629       -.3520121        .6708341
       markv      9.568026     11.73057       -2.162545        .8357392
       turno      .2622121     .1888162        .0733959        4.445079
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed
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Appendix D 
Consumer Discretionary----level of risk 
 
end of do-file
. 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(14, 58) =    19.55              Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .94218452   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    6.4072263
     sigma_u    25.865209
                                                                              
       _cons      46.9915   3.636133    12.92   0.000     39.71299    54.27001
     indust3    (dropped)
     indust2    (dropped)
      bmequi     14.24702   7.942988     1.79   0.078    -1.652592    30.14664
        beta    (dropped)
      gearin     .1740611   .0922489     1.89   0.064    -.0105952    .3587175
                                                                              
     riskdis        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4619                        Prob > F           =    0.0963
                                                F(2,58)            =      2.44
       overall = 0.1026                                        max =         5
       between = 0.1588                                        avg =       5.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.0775                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: firm                            Number of groups   =        15
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        75
. xtreg  riskdis gearin beta bmequi indust2 indust3, fe
 
end of do-file
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .83030377   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    6.4072263
     sigma_u    14.172696
                                                                              
       _cons     55.89389   14.69785     3.80   0.000     27.08664    84.70113
     indust3    -19.00615   10.19865    -1.86   0.062    -38.99514     .982847
     indust2     27.59068   11.31426     2.44   0.015     5.415145    49.76622
      bmequi     10.69403   7.761776     1.38   0.168    -4.518772    25.90683
        beta    -6.188124    5.93913    -1.04   0.297     -17.8286    5.452356
      gearin     .1552454   .0901769     1.72   0.085    -.0214981    .3319888
                                                                              
     riskdis        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(5)       =     30.79
       overall = 0.6472                                        max =         5
       between = 0.6832                                        avg =       5.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.0763                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: firm                            Number of groups   =        15
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        75
. xtreg riskdis gearin beta bmequi indust2 indust3, re
 
 
end of do-file
. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       34.68
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      bmequi      14.24702     10.69403        3.552995        1.686974
      gearin      .1740611     .1552454        .0188158        .0194421
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed
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Appendix E 
Consumer discretionary ? company performance 
end of do-file
. 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(14, 57) =    21.28              Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .96343033   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    6.3058161
     sigma_u    32.366142
                                                                              
       _cons     58.50436   9.959465     5.87   0.000     38.56088    78.44785
     indust3    (dropped)
     indust2    (dropped)
         roe    -.0000293   .0008396    -0.03   0.972    -.0017106     .001652
         dps      12.7198   5.055656     2.52   0.015     2.596028    22.84358
        prom    -.2544648    .254443    -1.00   0.321    -.7639781    .2550485
                                                                              
     riskdis        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8511                        Prob > F           =    0.0582
                                                F(3,57)            =      2.64
       overall = 0.4857                                        max =         5
       between = 0.5676                                        avg =       5.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.1219                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: firm                            Number of groups   =        15
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        75
. xtreg  riskdis prom dps roe indust2 indust3, fe
 
 
 
end of do-file
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .76680685   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    6.3058161
     sigma_u    11.434743
                                                                              
       _cons     49.97173   9.144013     5.46   0.000      32.0498    67.89367
     indust3     -21.6113   8.655479    -2.50   0.013    -38.57573   -4.646869
     indust2     39.31146   9.391333     4.19   0.000     20.90478    57.71813
         roe     .0002365   .0008849     0.27   0.789    -.0014979    .0019709
         dps     9.630202     4.6226     2.08   0.037     .5700734    18.69033
        prom    -.1471296   .2051747    -0.72   0.473    -.5492646    .2550055
                                                                              
     riskdis        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(5)       =     41.60
       overall = 0.6342                                        max =         5
       between = 0.6672                                        avg =       5.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.1185                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: firm                            Number of groups   =        15
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        75
. xtreg riskdis prom dps roe indust2 indust3, re
 
end of do-file
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2265
                          =        4.35
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         roe     -.0000293     .0002365       -.0002658               .
         dps       12.7198     9.630202        3.089602        2.047249
        prom     -.2544648    -.1471296       -.1073352        .1504811
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed
 
 
 
